How a 1985 DUI caused a Pennsylvania man to have his license suspended in 2010.

The fact that PennDOT even challenged this by taking it to an appeals court is a terrible misuse of the departments time and resources.  If our tax dollars pay for these attorneys and clerks to punish someone who by any common sense should be given some leeway is horrid. We need a law that will allow some common sense to be used in these rulings. I have seen far too many cases where our state has gone to the furthest extent allowable by law to prevent someone from keeping their license. It needs to be changed!

I can not say the law that clearly states "conviction" rather than "violation" is an error on PennDOT's part, but they can choose not to appeal the first courts decision that the DUI over 20 years ago should count as a second because of another states misuse of the word.

Surprising as it may seem, sometimes 25 is less than 10, at least in the eyes of the law. That was the effect of the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court's recent decision in the case of Dick v. Commonwealth, No. 45 C.D. 2010 (Pa.Commw.Ct. 2010). The issue in the case was whether a DUI that Mr. David Dick had committed in another state in 1985 disqualified him for a provision of Pennsylvania law that grants some leniency to DUI defendants who have stayed of out trouble for at least 10 years. As  a result of some administrative errors and the particular wording of the Pennsylvania law, the court ruled against Mr. Dick.
Mr. Dick was on summer vacation from a college in Ohio and took a job in Maine in 1985. On June 28, 1985, he was arrested for OUI in Maine. Mr. Dick spoke to a Maine attorney who told him that because Maine and Ohio did not have a reciprocity agreement (an agreement whereby each state agrees to prosecute its own citizens for violations of the other state's DUI laws), he could just return to Ohio and never answer the Main charges. Mr. Dick did so, but one year later moved to Pennsylvania, which does have a reciprocity agreement with Maine. As a result, the Pennsylvania Department of Transportation ("PennDOT") revoked Mr. Dick's license in 1986.
After consulting with Pennsylvania officials, Mr. Dick entered an alcoholism education and treatment program and graduated in 1991. Mr. Dick had been assured by officials in both Pennsylvania and Maine that completing the program would dispose of the DUI charge and the license suspension. He sent proof that he had completed the course to officials in both states, but for whatever reason, Maine did not remove the DUI offense from Mr. Dick's record. Mr. Dick discovered this about 12 years later when a Maine prosecutor told him that he was still considered a fugitive in that state. To clear his name, Mr. Dick went to Maine in 2004, paid a fine, and spent a night in jail. The Maine courts entered this on his records as a "conviction," a fact which would come back to haunt Mr. Dick when he was convicted of DUI 5 years later in Pennsylvania.
Pennsylvania law includes a mandatory license suspension for repeat DUI offenders. However, Mr. Dick had been told that his license would not be suspended if he pled guilty to the 2009 charge because of 75 Pa.C.S. section 3806(b). This is a Pennsylvania statute which defines a prior conviction as "any conviction...within the ten years before the present violation occurred." Mr. Dick pled guilty, but PennDOT called a license suspension hearing anyway. At this hearing, PennDOT used the Maine records showing a 2004 "conviction" to try to prove that Mr. Dick was a repeat offender. The court disagreed, ruling that because the DUI event to which the Maine records referred occurred substantially more than 10 years ago, it shouldn't count as a prior conviction within 10 years.
PennDOT appealed, arguing that 75 Pa.C.S. section 3806(b) clearly state that the 10 years begin to run from the time of "any conviction." Because Maine recorded Mr. Dick's resolution of the DUI in 2004 as a "conviction," PennDOT reasoned that only 5 years had passed since his last conviction and he was therefore a repeat offender.
The appellate court agreed, ruling that the word "conviction" in the statute meant precisely what it says. Therefore, once PennDOT provides evidence of a conviction, Mr. Dick must show that he was not convicted. The fact that Maine chose to use the word "conviction" for what was essentially a procedural resolution was conclusive; Mr. Dick had been convicted. Consequently, the Commonwealth Court reversed the decision of the trial court and ordered Mr. Dick's license suspended.